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The Long Fall of King Coal

Longannet_Power_Station_7_December_2011 (1)

When did Britain’s age of coal come to an end? A commonsensical answer to this question is likely to appeal to the decisive defeat the miners suffered during the great strike of 1984-5 and the swift closure of collieries that followed in the decade after.

Energy scholars such as Timothy Mitchell are more likely to point to the transition towards an oil economy in the immediate postwar period.[1] Long before the mid-1980s, Britain had become a car-driven society dependent on petrochemical manufacturing processes and oil had even begun to play a significant role in Britain’s electricity generation by the early 1970s.[2]

King coal’s fall was certainly longer than a story of rapid contraction allows for, but rather than being squarely located in an earlier time-period, it is a story that stretches into the present. British coal production and employment peaked at almost 300 million tons and over a million miners during the second decade of the twentieth century and has been in more or less sustained contraction since the early 1920s. It was only in 2020, during the midst of lockdown, that Britain went without coal-fired electricity for two months for the first time in over 130 years.

These developments are a sign of things to come. Britain is on track to end coal-fired electricity by the mid-2020s. Scotland’s last coal power station, Longannet, closed in 2016. Fourteen years earlier, in 2002, the curtain was brought down on a centuries-long historical saga when miners rose from the last of the drift mines dug to supply Longannet for the final time. This brought Scottish deep coal mining to an end.

I was finalising my PhD thesis on deindustrialization in Scotland’s coalfields when Longannet power station closed. My research included several interviews with men who had worked at the complex and were among the nation’s last miners. My first monograph was published this year, Coal Country: The Meaning and Memory of Deindustrialization in Postwar Scotland.[3]

Coal Country approaches deindustrialization, the declining significance of industrial activities to employment and economic production, as a long-term historical economic process which had foundational cultural and political consequences. It understands the entire lifetime of Longannet power station, and the modernised mining complex which directly fuelled it with coal won beneath the Firth of Forth, as framed by deindustrialization.

Longannet was planned during the 1960s and contextualised by the numerical peak of coal mining job losses. Scottish coalfield employment stood at just over 30,000 in 1970 when the power station began producing electricity, less than half what it had been a decade before. These tens of thousands of job losses were negotiated through moral economy customs that evolved between the management of Britain’s nationalised coal industry and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM).

Closures were agreed in consultation with union representatives, transfers to suitable jobs were found for miners within travel distance of their homes and suitable accommodations were made for injured, disabled and elderly miners, including the option to retire early in some cases.

These practices evolved over time, originating in responses to sustained closured in the Shotts area of Lanarkshire after the Second World War when the workforce defied Coal Board expectations of mass emigration to collieries in eastern and central Scotland. Instead, a ‘take work to the workers’ policy was pursued by civil servants, including the direction of inward investment in engineering to stabilise the local labour market. This approach was subsequently followed across the Scottish coalfields during the 1950s and 1960s.[4]

Job losses and fears of economic insecurity nevertheless fuelled dissatisfaction. Longannet became a key site in the 1972 strike over miners’ wages when the NUM Scottish Area (NUMSA) mounted mass pickets who clashed with police.[5] A decade earlier, a ‘strong coal lobby’ connected to the Scottish Office had insisted on investment in additional electricity capacity due to concern about sector’s future and employment consequences.[6] Later in the 1960s, the NUMSA responded to mounting colliery closures by becoming a leading proponent of a devolved Scottish parliament within the labour movement.[7]

Longannet strengthened the articulation of a Scottish national coalfield community that overcame traditional parochial associations. Pat Egan relocated from Twechar in Lanarkshire to Glenrothes in Fife so he could take up work at the complex after Bedlay colliery shut in 1982. When I interviewed him in 2014, Pat explained that regional voting blocs in union elections dissipated over time and that trusting relationships were built between men who travelled to work at Longannet each day from Lanarkshire, Fife, Clackmannanshire and the Lothians.[8]

Coal Country confronts the need to understand deindustrialization as a formative structural process and an intensely personal experience whose intricacies determined life courses and remoulded community, class and nationhood. The contraction of Scotland’s coalfields unfolded across the second half of the twentieth century, but its pace was determined by the agency of workers, politicians, nationalised industry managers and civil servants.

Archival records from government, industry and unions provide a detailed vantage on the contingencies that shaped deindustrialization. Oral testimonies are insightful for understanding how workplace closures and job losses were experienced in the coalfields and what these changes came to mean in the twenty-first century.

Earlier this year, Longannet power station’s boiler house was subject to a controlled demolition and the large chimney is set to follow soon. Visible signs of the role coal played in transforming Scotland over the last two centuries are disappearing from the landscape, whilst the energy transition that led to Longannet’s closure continues apace. The Neart na Gaoithe windfarm is under construction in the North Sea near the Fife coast.

Moral economy sentiments and arguments over the responsibility of governments to use Scottish national resources in the interests of communities continue to animate workers’ perspectives. Unions have condemned of the ‘paltry return’ of local jobs and production provided by wind turbine multinational supply chains. The concerns and conflicts which animated deindustrialization in the Scottish coalfields will continue to reverberate in the context of debates over a ‘just transition’ to renewables.

Ewan Gibbs is a lecturer in Economic and Social History at the University of Glasgow. He published Coal Country: The Meaning and Memory of Deindustrialization in Postwar Scotland with the University of London Press and is beginning a BA-Wolfson Fellowship studying energy transitions. You can find Ewan on Twitter @ewangibbs


Cover image: Longannet Power Station 7 December 2011, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Longannet_Power_Station_7_December_2011.jpg [accessed 25 July 2021]

[1] Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (London: Verso, 2013).

[2] James Marriott and Terry Macalister, Crude Britannia: How Oil Shaped a Nation Kindle Edition (London: Pluto, 2021).

[3] Ewan Gibbs, Coal Country: The Meaning and Memory of Deindustrialization in Postwar Scotland (London: University of London Press, 2021).

[4] The National Records of Scotland, Edinburgh, Scottish Economic Policy, 4/762, H. S. Phillips, Research studies: geographical movement of labour, 9 August 1948.

[5] Jim Phillips, The Industrial Politics of Devolution: Scotland in the 1960s and 1970s (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008) p.126.

[6] The National Archives, Kew, London, Ministry of Fuel and Power, 14/1495, Ministry of Power General Division, TUC and Fuel and Power policy brief for minister’s meeting on 12 February 1963.

[7] STUC, Annual Report 1967–1968, lxxi (1968), 191–2.

[8] Pat Egan, interview with author, Fife College, Glenrothes, 5 February 2014.

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50 Years of the Misuse of Drugs Act (1971)

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On 27 May, it is exactly fifty years since the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (MDA), the UK’s primary legislation for controlling drugs, received Royal Assent.

The Act arranged drugs into a three-tier classification system – A, B and C – with controls based on the perceived relative harm of different substances. Now the legislation is at the centre of a campaign by Transform Drug Policy who are calling for an overhaul of the law which the organisation considers having represented ‘50 years of failure’. 

One of the rationales behind the MDA was to consolidate the existing patchwork of legislation that had developed in the UK since the Pharmacy Act of 1868. This was the first time Parliament recognised a risk to the public from ‘poisoning’ and the 1868 Act distinguished between substances that were ‘toxic’ (poisons) and substances that were both ‘toxic’ and ‘addictive’ (‘dangerous drugs’). 

Some of these so-called ‘drugs of addiction’ were later subject to further controls under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1920 (DDA) which introduced prescriptions and criminalised unauthorised possession of opium, morphine, heroin and cocaine. 

Whilst this did represent a continuation of wartime drug control efforts it was also the result of a racist media-led panic around Chinese opium dens, as well as being a response to international moves toward uniformity on drug regulation. 

The DDA was later clarified by the Departmental Committee on Morphine and Heroin Addiction in their 1926 ‘Rolleston Report’. This formed an interpretation of the Act that became known as the ‘British System’, framing ‘drug addiction’ as a medical issue rather than a moral failing. 

By the 1950s, drugs were becoming increasingly connected in public consciousness with youth subculture and – especially in the tabloid press – black communities and the London jazz scene, stoking further moral panic. 

By 1958, the British Medical Journal observed that the regulations around drugs and poisons were already ‘rather complicated’.[1] This picture was complicated yet further by the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs which laid out an international regime of drug control, ratified in the UK in 1964 by another Dangerous Drugs Act

Another committee was also formed under the Chairmanship of Lord Brain, ultimately leading to (yet another) Dangerous Drugs Act in 1967 which held onto the principles of the ‘British System’ but introduced new stipulations, such as requiring doctors to apply for a licence from the Home Office for certain prescriptions. 

During the 1960s, drugs continued to be associated in popular imagination with youth, with most attention by 1967 on the ‘Counterculture’ and ‘the hippies’, and in particular their use of cannabis and LSD. That same year, Mick Jagger’s country retreat in Redlands was raided by the drugs squad in a bust that was symbolic of a broader clash of ideologies.

The arrest and harsh sentencing of Jagger, Keith Richards and their friend Robert Fraser prompted William Rees-Mogg’s famous Times editorial ‘Who Breaks a Butterfly on a Wheel?’ on 1 July 1967. This became part of a wider public debate on drug use and on 16 July a ‘Legalise Pot’ rally took place in Hyde park, followed on 24 July by a full-page advert (paid for by Paul McCartney) in the Times calling for cannabis law reform.  

Imaginatively, the Government decided to convene another committee, this time under Baroness Wootton. Its report, published at the end of 1968, argued that whilst it did not think cannabis should be legalised, it should be made distinct in law from other illegal drugs. 

Finally in 1970, Home Secretary James Callaghan introduced a new Bill that was described during its passage through Parliament as an attempt to replace ‘…the present rigid and ramshackle collection of drug Acts by a single comprehensive measure’.[2] But the Bill was as ideological as it was pragmatic, and Callaghan himself had rejected the recommendations of Wootton.

The debates in both the Commons and the Lords indicate that not only did most Members of Parliament who spoke on the subject have little understanding of the complexities of drug use, but also that the theme of the ‘permissive society’ and its supposed excesses was central.

The Bill was approved in May 1971, given Royal Assent the same month and fully implemented after two more years. The Act also established the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD), tasked with keeping the drug situation in the UK under review. 

Successive governments have tended to accept the recommendations of the Council but there have been clashes, such as in 2009 when there was a total breakdown of relations when Professor David Nutt, then Chair of the Council, was sacked by Home Secretary Alan Johnson after Nutt had claimed – with substantial evidence – that MDMA and LSD were less dangerous than alcohol. 

For all of this, what has actually been the impact of the MDA? Well, as Simon Jenkins recently pointed out in a blog for the Guardian, 27,000 children and teenagers are now involved in ‘country lines’ drug gangs. Jenkins had previously described the MDA as a law that has done ‘less good and more harm’ than any other law on the statute book.

It is difficult to argue with this. Far from stemming recreational drug use, use of illegal drugs only increased after the MDA and became endemic in cities during the 1980s as heroin became a significant social issue. In 1979, the number of notified heroin users exceeded 1,000 for the first time. 

Over the 1980s and 1990s, drugs like MDMA were also increasingly used to enhance users’ experiences, especially in rave contexts, yet the Government line remained the same. As drug and harm reduction expert Julian Buchanan argued in 2000, ‘two decades of prevention, prohibition and punishment have had little noticeable impact upon the growing use of illegal drugs’.[3]

The MDA also deterred drug users from seeking help for fear of legal repercussions and limited the opportunities of countless young people. Last year, Adam Holland noted in the Harm Reduction Journal that in the UK, drug-related deaths were at the highest level on record and that although enormous time and money has gone into combating the illicit drugs trade, the market has not stopped growing.[4]

Writing thirty years after the MDA, Buchanan had argued that a ‘bold and radical rethink of UK drug policy’ was needed. Such a rethink never materialised. In 2019, the House of Commons Select Committee on Drug Policy concluded that ‘UK drugs policy is failing’. Now after half a century it might be time for real radical change, and the anniversary presents a great opportunity for this conversation to gain momentum. 

Hallam Roffey is a PhD Candidate in the Department of History at the University of Sheffield. His research looks at the idea of ‘acceptability’ in English culture between 1970 and 1990, examining changing attitudes around sexually explicit imagery, violent media, offensive speech and blasphemy. You can find Hallam on Twitter @HallamRoffey


[1] John Glaister and Edgar Rentoul, ‘The Control of the Sale of Poisons and Dangerous Drugs’, British Medical Journal (1958;2), p. 1525.

[2] House of Lords debate (October 1969), Hansard volume 790, cols 189-90.

[3] Julian Buchanan and L. Young, ‘The War on Drugs—A War on Drug Users’, Drugs: Education, Prevention, Policy 7:4 (2000), pp. 409-22.

[4] Adam Holland, ‘An ethical analysis of UK drug policy as an example of a criminal justice approach to drugs: a commentary on the short film Putting UK Drug Policy into Focus’, Harm Reduction Journal 17:97 (2020).

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Dawson’s ‘Big Idea’: The Enduring Appeal of the Primary Healthcare Centre in Britain

Retford

May 2020 marks the centenary of the publication of the Interim Report of the Consultative Council on the Future of Medical and Allied Services, popularly known as the Dawson report after its principal author, Lord Dawson of Penn.[i] The report, commissioned in 1919 by the newly established Ministry of Health, outlined a plan to bring together existing services funded by national health insurance, local authorities, and voluntary bodies in a coherent and comprehensive healthcare system. The final report was never published, being consigned to oblivion by a worsening economy and changed political climate. Though cautiously welcomed by professional leaders, Dawson’s plan was condemned by a hostile press as grandiose and unaffordable.[ii] However, recent NHS policy directives regarding Integrated Care Systems show that the principal task which Dawson’s group had set itself, that of successfully integrating primary, secondary and ‘allied’ health services, is one with which NHS leaders are still grappling today.[iii]

Lord Dawson of Penn, courtesy of the British Medical Association archive

Central to Dawson’s plan, and its most revolutionary idea, was the creation of a network of ‘primary health centres’ (PHCs) in each district in which general practitioners (GPs) could access diagnostic, surgical, and laboratory facilities for their patients and which would also house infant welfare and maternity services, facilities to promote physical health, and space for administration, records, and postgraduate education. GPs and other professionals would see and treat patients at PHCs, referring only complex cases to specialists at secondary care centres (essentially district hospitals) located in large towns, while patients needing the most specialized treatment would be referred to regional teaching hospitals with attached medical schools. This ‘hub and spoke’ model is one to which recent generations of NHS health planners have returned time and again, seemingly unaware of its antecedents.

A firm believer in teamwork, Dawson hoped that collaborative use of PHCs by GPs would encourage group practice and multi-disciplinary working. But the individualistic nature of general practice at that time meant GPs remained wary of his ideas, despite the fact that examples of PHCs already existed in Gloucestershire and in Scotland and many of the facilities they were meant to comprise could be found in GP-run cottage hospitals and Poor Law infirmaries.[iv] Experiments with architect-designed health centres in the 1920s and 1930s failed to elicit a major change in professional or governmental attitudes.[v] In 1948 the NHS brought public, voluntary and local authority hospitals under state control but in its early years the promise of new PHCs remained largely unrealised.[vi] Proprietorial traditions and fear of local government control led to a mushrooming of purpose- built, GP-owned practice premises between the late 1960s and 1990s independently of local authority-owned health centres, for which there was a major building programme in the 1970s.[vii]

Illustration of a Primary Health Centre, from the Dawson Report, courtesy of the BMA archive

Although by the late twentieth century the Dawson report had largely been forgotten, interest in PHCs resurfaced in the early 2000s with a major investment in primary healthcare facilities through the establishment of Local Improvement Finance Trusts (LIFT). These were a form of private finance initiative designed to provide state of the art community health and social care hubs housing GP practices and other services. Unfortunately, LIFT buildings proved more expensive than anticipated and their facilities, intended to promote the transfer of work from secondary to primary care, were often underutilised.[viii] While these were being constructed, the Labour health minister, Lord Ara Darzi, announced the establishment of a number of ‘polyclinics’, bearing a close resemblance to Dawson’s PHC idea. However, the Darzi Centres that were established were either mothballed or repurposed, being condemned as an expensive ‘white elephant’ by professional leaders.[ix]

In the last few years a ‘quiet revolution’ has been taking place in the NHS in England involving attempts to dismantle the financial and institutional barriers between primary, secondary and community care created by the internal market. Its byword, ‘Integration’, echoes Dawson’s overriding goal and the ‘hub and spoke model’ he advocated is now well established. Meanwhile, the pressures of unending demand have forced GPs to collaborate as healthcare providers in locality groups called Primary Care Networks (PCNs). Though guidance on these is not prescriptive, some PCNs have adopted the idea of a community ‘hub’ housing shared diagnostic and treatment facilities much as Dawson had envisaged.[x]

While the full impact of COVID-19 on our struggling health services is still unknown, the abiding necessity for all parts of the NHS to collaborate, communicate and mutually support each other during this crisis underlines the value and relevance of Dawson’s vision of integrated services. It remains to be seen if, in its aftermath, his ‘big idea’ of ubiquitous multi-purpose PHCs will come any closer to being realised.

Chris Locke is a fourth year PhD student in the History Department at the University of Sheffield. His research is focused on the political consciousness of British GPs and their struggle for professional self-determination in the early Twentieth Century.

Cover image: LIFT -built Primary Care Centre, Retford, Nottinghamshire, photographed by the author.

[i] Interim Report of the Consultative Council on the Future of Medical and Allied Services, Cmd 693 HMSO  1920. For an account of the origins and significance of the report see Frank Honigsbaum, The Division in British Medicine (London, 1979) chapters 6-12.

[ii] The British Medical Association’s blueprint for health services reform, A General Medical Service for the Nation (1930) and the report by Political and Economic Planning, The British Health Services (1937) both referenced the Dawson report, and it clearly influenced the Beveridge report, Social Insurance and Allied Services (1942).

[iii] https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/making-sense-integrated-care-systems (last accessed 3 April 2020)

[iv] The report referenced the hub and spoke model of healthcare facilities overseen by Gloucestershire County Council’s Medical Officer of Health, Dr J Middleton Martin. Commentators also noted similarities with Sir James McKenzie’s Primary Care Clinic in St Andrews and Trade Union-run Medical Aid Institutes in South Wales.

[v] Jane Lewis and Barbara Brookes, ‘A Reassessment of the Work of the Peckham Health Centre 1926-1951’, Health and Society vol 61, 2, 1983 pp.307-350; For Finsbury Health Centre see A B Stewart, ‘Health Centres of Today’, The Lancet, 16 March 1946 pp. 392-393.

[vi] For one exception see R H Parry et al, ‘The William Budd Health Centre: the First Year’, British Medical Journal, 15 March 1954 pp.388-392.

[vii] BMA General Practitioners Committee guidance: The Future of GP Practice Premises (Revised 2010)

[viii] Nottinghamshire Local Medical Committee, NHS LIFT in Nottinghamshire (Nottingham,1997)

[ix] Peter Davies, ‘Darzi Centres: an expensive luxury the UK can no longer afford?’, British Medical Journal, 13 November 2010, 341; c6237.

[x] https://www.england.nhs.uk/primary-care/primary-care-networks/ (last accessed 3 April 2020)

 

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