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European Modern History

Delight, Dismay and Disbelief: Reactions to the Death of Hitler, 75 Years Ago

Hitler_salute_in_front_of_lamppost

It is 75 years since Adolf Hitler committed suicide in his Berlin bunker. His death continues to generate considerable public interest thanks to both continuing forensic discoveries about his biological remains, and the persistence of outlandish tales of his postwar survival. While no serious historian believes in the latter, it is worth considering how confused reporting of Hitler’s fate in spring 1945 created a climate ripe for the flourishing of such legends.

The first formal declaration of Hitler’s death came late on the evening of 1 May 1945 via a radio broadcast by Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz. Sombre music and drum rolls gave way to the momentous announcement: ‘our Führer, Adolf Hitler, has fallen. In the deepest sorrow and respect, the German people bow’. It was, proclaimed Dönitz, a ‘hero’s death’, Hitler falling in battle while fighting valiantly against the ‘Bolshevik storm’.

‘Hitler Dead’ screamed countless international headlines the next day. The bold, dramatic and matter-of-fact statement left little room for ambiguity. Hitler had met his end, National Socialism was vanquished and the Second World War was effectively over. The Daily Herald printed a caricature of a burning Nazi emblem under the slogan ‘WAStika’. The cover of Time magazine simply struck Hitler’s face out with a large red cross.

The media’s response to Hitler’s passing was predominantly one of intense relief. ‘The whole building cheered’, recalled Karl Lehmann, a member of the BBC Monitoring unit. Numerous editorials depicted it as a moment of universal liberation – ‘a terrible scourge and force of evil has been removed’, declared the Lancashire Daily Post.[1] The sense of catharsis continued into the VE Day celebrations a few days later when the burning of Hitler’s effigy typically formed the high point of the UK’s festivities.

In the midst of this jubilation, however, there was widespread uncertainty about the precise cause of death. Dönitz’s talk of Hitler ‘falling’ in battle filled the first wave of international news reports, but many of the accompanying editorials urged caution about accepting this at face value. There was suspicion that either the Nazis were exaggerating the circumstances of his demise to foster a ‘Hitler legend’, or that they were peddling an entirely false narrative to distract from his retreat from the scene. Questioned on the matter during a White House press conference, President Harry S. Truman insisted that he had it ‘on the best authority possible’ that Hitler was, indeed, dead – but conceded there were no details yet as to how he died.

The press were right to question the death-in-battle scenario invented in the Dönitz broadcast. Stationed in Flensburg, over 270 miles away from the death scene, the Admiral was reliant upon information fed to him by colleagues in Führerbunker, namely Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels and Head of the Party Chancellery Martin Bormann. The pair had already delayed sending definitive news of Hitler’s passing, prompting Dönitz to misdate the fatal moment to the afternoon of 1 May, rather than the 30 April. They also neglected to supply details of what, exactly, had occurred, leaving Dönitz to fill in the gaps for himself. As it transpired, he was not the only person speculating on Hitler’s fate.

United States made propaganda forgery of Nazi German stamp. Portrait of Hitler made into skull; instead of “German Reich” the stamp reads “Lost Reich”. Produced by Operation Cornflakes, U.S. Office of Strategic Services, circa 1942, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Futsches-Reich-Briefmarke-UK.jpg [accessed 29 April 2020]

The Western Allies, anxious to puncture martyrdom myths before they could take hold, swiftly countered Dönitz’s heroic imagery by reviving rumours of Hitler’s previously failing health. The Soviets, meanwhile, denounced reports of Hitler’s death as a ‘fascist trick’ to conceal his escape from Berlin. Even when reports of a Hitler suicide emerged from 3 May, debate continued as to whether the Nazi leader had shot himself or taken cyanide – poison being perceived by the Soviets as a particularly cowardly (and thus eminently appropriate) way out for Hitler.

What, though, did the general public make of all this? Within hours of the Dönitz broadcast, the New York Times and the social research organisation Mass Observation were gauging reactions across Manhattan and London respectively. At first, the news appeared anticlimactic; people who had longed for this moment felt disoriented, numb or empty now it was finally upon them. As the implications sunk in, Hitler’s death raised optimism that the war might finally be over, but dashed hopes that the public would see him brought to justice. ‘Too bad he’s dead’, mused one young New Yorker, ‘he should have been tortured’.[2]

The overwhelming reaction to news of Hitler’s demise, though, was one of disbelief. Some sceptics perceived the whole affair as a Nazi ruse, with Hitler just waiting to ‘pop out again when we aren’t looking’. Others foreshadowed modern-day accusations of ‘fake news’, directing their cynicism towards the contradictory explanations printed in the Allied press for Hitler’s demise. Mistrust of Nazi propaganda was also, understandably, common with one Londoner reflecting, ‘I don’t believe he died fighting. They just said that to make it seem more – you know – the way he’d have wanted people to think he died… I think personally he’s been out of the way for a long time now.’[3]

Ultimately, the competing versions of Hitler’s death ensured that the timing and cause of his demise became quite fluid within the public imagination. This, together with initial Soviet refusals to disclose the recovery of an identifiable corpse outside the bunker, created a vacuum in which all manner of rumours could take root. By contrast, the death of Benito Mussolini was commonly regarded with satisfaction because the deliberate display of his body rendered it an indisputable fact. It was only in 2000 that images of Hitler’s jaw (alongside a fragment of skull erroneously attributed to him) were publicly exhibited in Moscow, demonstrating how documenting the truth about his fate has proved a protracted process, and explaining why the Nazi leader has managed to remain so ‘alive’ in public discussion for all these years.

Caroline Sharples is Senior Lecturer in Modern European History at the University of Roehampton.  Her research focuses on memories of National Socialism, representations of the Holocaust and perpetrator commemoration. She is currently writing a cultural history of the death of Adolf Hitler. You can find her on Twitter @carol1ne_louise.

Cover image: Adolf Hitler, prior to 1945.

[1] Lancashire Daily Post, ‘Hitler’s Exit’ (2 May 1945), p.2.

[2] New York Times, ‘City Takes Report of Death in Stride’ (2 May 1945), p.9.

[3] Mass Observation Archive, University of Sussex, Topic Collection 49/1/1: ‘Hitler Indirects’, Hampstead, 2 May 1945.

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Human Rights and the COVID-19 Lockdown

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The speed with which we have given up some of our most basic rights and freedoms in the face of an incurable epidemic would be noteworthy, if it were not also such a cliché. Everyone has seen films in which the rights-bearing body of an individual becomes a disease-vector, and ultimately little more than toxic waste to be placed under rigorous cordon sanitaire, if not summarily obliterated. The mediocre Tom Clancy techno-thriller Executive Orders (1996) had the USA fight off a weaponised Ebola attack, with only conniving political opportunists moaning about rights, as the pragmatic authorities intoned the legal pabulum “the Constitution is not a suicide-pact!”[i]

Less entertainingly, it is also very nearly a truism of real-life commentary that the inequality with which “rights” are distributed in good times is multiplied in bad ones. While the virus itself may not discriminate, as we have been repeatedly advised, it seems to be having a disproportionate impact in the ethnic-minority communities of major Western nations, while the economic effects of lockdown are, of course, more violently traumatic the closer one is to the margins of society.

Human rights are supposedly universal and unconditional. But the protections they claim to offer have always proven flimsy and threadbare in practice. One reason for this is that the evolution of rights-language in the last three centuries is in fact frequently about two other things: firstly, an idea of grounded, foundational rectitude which has only partially shifted from theological to “scientific” underpinnings, and secondly, the doctrine of state sovereignty, historically entangled with the assertion of national identity. In the way they are used in practice in the world, “human rights” are frequently a cover for assertions and practices that entirely contradict their supposed premise of individual autonomy and security.

Human rights began their modern life as “natural rights”, an offshoot of centuries of European intellectual debate about the existence and contours of “natural law”. Understood, implicitly and explicitly, as a function of the fact of an ordered and purposive divine creation, and of the sovereign state as a component of such an order, rights retained their theological tinge very clearly into the Age of Enlightenment. The US Declaration of Independence invoked the “laws of nature and of nature’s God” as its foundation, spoke of the trinity of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness as rights “endowed by their Creator” upon men, and appealed to “the Supreme Judge of the world” for validation. Thirteen years later, the French declared the “natural and imprescriptible rights of man” at the heart of a document they decreed to be proclaimed “in the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme Being”.

The French declaration of 1789 also placed the imagined rights-bearing individual in a complex and ultimately subordinated relationship to the other rising force of the era, in stating that “The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation”, and that “Law is the expression of the general will.” Across the declaration’s seventeen articles, although “every citizen” has the “right” to participate in lawmaking, the law itself – the encoded power of the nation-state – stands above anyone’s “liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression” (the four enumerated natural rights).[ii]

The modern sovereign nation-state that increasingly took shape in the 1800s was built on claims of inherent superiority that displaced divinity with reason, but were no less, and sometimes more, discriminatory as a result. In France, even before the Revolution had transitioned into Napoleon’s dictatorship, the savants of the new National Institute had taken up the reins of scientific leadership dropped by the abolished royal academies of the old order. Alongside scholars of the sciences and literature, equal prominence was given to practitioners of the “moral and political sciences”.

One of the supposedly great truths that these scholars enunciated, for a country now explicitly referring to itself as “the Great Nation”, was that such a nation, while naturally superior to others, also contained many – multitudes indeed – who did not measure up, individually, to that greatness. France’s leading intellectuals quite deliberately defined the egalitarian republicanism to which they were sworn as something that required, in practice, a rigorous hierarchical division between the fully-enlightened and able elite, and the majority, still seeking to pull themselves out of the mire of the past, who could only expect to be led, gently but firmly, for the foreseeable future.

The legacy of the early nineteenth-century approach to the superiority of rational knowledge has been the creation of waves of ideological thinking, predicated on the foundational entitlement of those who know better to dominate and manipulate the common herd. Over the past two centuries, ideologies from to fascism to Marxism-Leninism, via the imperial liberalism that dominated Anglo-American and French public life, have used claims about their superior understanding of past, present, and future to claim the right to forcibly remake humanity for the collective good, using the overwhelming power of the state.

When the founders of the United Nations produced a Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, they proposed to endow all people with a remarkably wide-ranging set of entitlements. The first clause of Article 25 states:

Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

A noble aim, perhaps, but also a staggering act of hypocrisy on the part of France and the UK, ruling over swathes of subjugated and impoverished empire, the USSR, winding up to launch the antisemitic persecution of the so-called “Doctors’ Plot”, and the USA, mired in racial segregation and discrimination. The ultimate paradox of the notion of individual “rights” is that, if they are violated by a higher power, only a yet-higher and more righteous power can set matters straight. It is easy to believe such a power can exist, much harder to identify it in practice.

The past six decades have seen repeated and ever-more elaborate forms of international covenants binding states to increasing portfolios of rights that purport to demand respect. Yet, where are we? Half of the world’s ten largest countries – more than 3 billion people in those five states alone – are ruled by demagogues and autocrats.[iii] The UN’s “Human Rights Council”, founded in 2006, is a rotating talking-shop of forty-seven states which to date has never failed to include some of the world’s most notorious human-rights abusers in its membership.

Sitting in our homes, in a world which has, with the best intentions, summarily crushed many of our most fundamental everyday freedoms, we might legitimately wonder whether all discussion of “human rights” remains in the shadow of its pre-modern origins. We have, mostly, displaced the notion of divinely-ordained absolute sovereignty with more modern ideas, but we may well have given the sovereign nation and the state that embodies it almost as much power, while gaining in return little real regard for the individuals whose rights it supposedly protects.

David Andress is Professor of Modern History at the University of Portsmouth, and author of many works on the era of the French Revolution. He edited the Oxford Handbook of the French Revolution (2015), and has recently published Cultural Dementia (2018) and The French Revolution: a peasants’ revolt (2019).

Cover image: The universal declaration of human rights, 10 December 1948.

[i] The short-lived 2004 BBC show Crisis Command grimly demonstrated what might happen if a plague outbreak in the UK was not mercilessly stamped out, and to hell with rights.

[ii] According to the canonical text, the law may constrain liberty, in a whole number of ways, if behaviour troubles “the public order established by law”; it may overrule people’s own understanding of both security and resistance to oppression, for “any citizen summoned or arrested in virtue of the law shall submit without delay, as resistance constitutes an offence.” It may even, in the text’s final article, take away property, despite this being reiterated as “an inviolable and sacred right”, as long as due forms are followed and compensation paid. And what those are, of course, will be determined by the law.

[iii] In 2005 the UN invented the doctrine of a collective “Responsibility to Protect” human rights in other states. In 2015 the Saudi government invoked its “responsibility” to “protect the people of Yemen and its legitimate government” in launching the savage and near-genocidal campaign that continues to this day.

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Holocaust Memorial Day: A Universalising Message?

Holocaust-Memorial-MKZE

On Monday 27 January, thousands gathered across the globe to commemorate International Holocaust Memorial Day 2020, which also marked the 75th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau – the Nazi concentration and extermination camp where European Jews and other minorities were imprisoned and murdered en masse. In Sheffield it was no different, with residents coming together for a candle lit vigil in the Winter Gardens that was well-attended by important representatives of the city, such as the Lord Mayor, as well as religious leaders from local Jewish, Muslim and Christian communities.

Every year Holocaust Memorial Day in the UK is given an accompanying theme by the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust and this year was no exception, the 2020 theme being ‘Stand Together’. Underlying this phrase is a message of solidarity: solidarity with Jews in the face of the global rise in antisemitic hate crime, solidarity with survivors, and solidarity with those who perished in the Holocaust – which is still subject to widespread denial and revisionism. This solidarity also allies us with the victims and survivors of subsequent genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Darfur, who are also commemorated on Holocaust Memorial Day.

Connecting this annual event with an overarching theme can help to direct the focus of Holocaust commemoration and make it more relevant to a contemporary audience, and to young people in particular. Symptomatic of our western liberal approach to memory making, however, these themes also have the potential to dilute or otherwise universalise the specific ‘lessons’ to be learnt from the attempted annihilation of European Jewry by Nazi Germany over seventy-five years ago.

This concern was brought to my attention during Sheffield’s own vigil, which opened with several upbeat renditions of well-known pop songs by a primary school choir, including (to my surprise) Randy Newman’s Toy Story hit ‘You Got a Friend in Me’. Audience members clapped along and applauded the performance, which led into the evening’s scheduled readings and reflections.

It’s encouraging that so many Sheffield residents of all ages and backgrounds feel willing and able to participate in a Holocaust Memorial Day vigil, which is always welcome to all. It is also perhaps easy to understand the inclusion of songs that advocate for friendship, camaraderie and love within an event of this kind, especially for children. The problem with using a Disney-associated song about the love of two fictional characters for a commemorative Holocaust vigil is that it entirely obfuscates the identities of the six million Jews murdered during the Holocaust.

We are in danger of reducing Holocaust Memorial Day to an event defined by well-meaning but platitudinal phrases such as ‘never again’, which serve to depoliticise the antisemitic roots of the Holocaust. Memory is always political and is inextricably linked to power and identity: this means we cannot refer to the ‘people’ who died during the Holocaust, as this constitutes a generalised description of the victims of Nazi genocide who were persecuted on the basis of their religious beliefs and ethnicities. As the numbers of those who witnessed the atrocities of the Holocaust first-hand are sadly dwindling, it is more important than ever that official commemorations of the Shoah (the Jewish Holocaust) are firmly situated in their historical and political contexts.

Yet there is a degree to which the sometimes-universalising effect of Britain’s National Holocaust Memorial Day is a product of our nation’s identity-affirming motives for establishing this commemorative event in the first place. Established in 2001, Holocaust Memorial Day was designed to bring national recognition to the suffering of Jewish victims and other minorities of the Holocaust, and to critically reflect on how the past can inform our approach to religious, ethnic and racial prejudice and discrimination in the present. As Daniel Tilles and John Richardson argue, however, Britain’s Holocaust Memorial Day is just as much about emphasising what Labour MP Andrew Dismore called the ‘positive values of Britain’ as it is about commemorating victims.[1]

As such, the Holocaust has been deployed in national commemorative practice as a tool not only to advance Britain’s false superiority as liberators, but, as historians have argued, to mask the more uncomfortable aspects of Britain’s wartime past. According to Tilles and Richardson, this includes Britain’s ‘collaboration in deporting Jewish residents from the occupied Channel Islands to Nazi death camps’ as well as its little-acknowledged ‘reluctance to facilitate the escape of Jewish refugees fleeing occupied Europe’.[2]

Moreover, the designation of a day dedicated to commemorating the Holocaust is an important opportunity to remember Holocaust victims. It should, however, be viewed as part of a rigorous and ongoing critical reflection regarding the treatment of Jews as well as a chance to educate upcoming generations of the atrocities of the Third Reich. In order to better express our solidarity with Jewish victims of persecution past and present, an acknowledgement of their identities must be at the forefront of British Holocaust commemoration, as should the current reality of antisemitism that increasingly rears its ugly head in the political sphere. Holocaust Memorial Day is not a marker of western sophistication; rather, it is a reminder of the continued threats of antisemitism, racism and xenophobia to minorities.

Emily-Rose Baker is a final year PhD researcher based in the School of English at the University of Sheffield. Her thesis examines postcommunist representations of Holocaust memory and dreams in central-eastern Europe, and is funded by the White Rose College of the Arts and Humanities (WRoCAH). You can find Emily on Twitter @emily_baker18.

Cover Image: Holocaust memorial in Rishon LeZion, Israel, 2006. Courtesy of Zachi Evenor. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Holocaust-Memorial-MKZE.jpg, [Accessed 3 February 2020}.

[1] Daniel Tilles and John Richardson, ‘Past, Present and Future: Poland’s New Memory Law Exposes the Problematic Nature of Holocaust Remembrance’, History Today, 68:5 (2018).

[2] Ibid.

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Mr. Jones: Rediscovering the Remarkable Journalism of Gareth Jones

Gareth_Jones_3

‘I don’t have an agenda, unless you call truth an agenda.’  So says James Norton as the titular character in the trailer for the new film Mr. Jones.  A line that might seem to connote dramatic hyperbole is actually admirable testament to the extraordinary career of Gareth Jones, a Welsh journalist whose life was tragically cut short in August 1935 on a reporting visit to China.

After serving as private secretary to former Prime Minister David Lloyd George, Jones became a reporter at the Western Mail in Cardiff.  A talented linguist, in early 1933 he was on hand in Germany to record Hitler’s rise to the chancellorship, and the story of Mr. Jones focuses on his travels in the Soviet Union in March 1933, where he discovered the extent of famine conditions in the Ukraine that resulted in an estimated death toll of between five and seven million.[1]

Western eyes had been opened to the Soviet Famine of 1932-33 by the reports of Malcolm Muggeridge that were published in the Manchester Guardian on 25, 27 and 28 March.  Jones himself returned to Berlin on 29 March and issued his own press release.  His depiction of life in the Ukraine was bleak: ‘Everywhere was the cry, “There is no bread; we are dying.”’[2]

Jones went further by attacking the complicity of the Soviet regime, recounting a train journey where he gave short shrift to the denials of a local Communist:  ‘I flung into the spittoon a crust of bread I had been eating from my own supply.  The peasant, my fellow-passenger, fished it out and ravenously ate it.  I threw orange peel into the spittoon.  The peasant again grabbed and devoured it.  The Communist subsided.’[3]

In making his case – he reported that the Soviet state had brought Russia ‘to the worst catastrophe since the famine of 1921’ – Jones refused to play the game that underpinned the work of Western journalists in Moscow.   Shockingly, however, this marked Jones out as a target for these same journalists.

Jones’s exposé occurred at the same time as the Metropolitan-Vickers trial, where six British engineers were arrested on inflated charges of espionage.  Eager for the story, Western journalists dared not jeopardise the favour of the Soviet regime.  Walter Duranty, played as a servile character in the film by Peter Sarsgaard, was English by birth and the doyenne of the press community as the Moscow correspondent for the New York Times, and he led efforts to discredit Jones.  His own report, ‘Russians Hungry But Not Starving’, shrugged off the scale of death and deprivation, claiming with semantic sophistry, ‘There is no actual starvation or deaths from starvation but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition’.[4]

The attacks on Jones were a combination of ideological apologia, journalistic self-interest, and unfortunate timing.  The Metropolitan-Vickers trial provided short-term leverage for the Soviets that was exploited by Konstantin Umansky, head of the Press Department of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.  At a celebration for Eugene Lyons, United Press correspondent in Moscow, a collective decision was taken over snacks and a ready supply of vodka to hang Jones out to dry.[5]

Jones’s revelations were somewhat dwarfed by this weight of denial.  He replied to Duranty directly in the New York Times on 13 May 1933, calling his fellow journalists ‘masters of euphemism and understatement’.[6]  But in this situation, Duranty’s seniority was a trump card; after all, he was awarded a Pulitzer Prize in April 1932 for his Soviet coverage.  The citation commended his reports as ‘marked by scholarship, profundity, impartiality, sound judgement and exceptional clarity’.[7]

Mystery surrounded Jones’s death in China on the day before his thirtieth birthday, with some suggestions that the Soviet state was implicated.  This tragedy has been extended by the relative loss of Jones to posterity.  He may have featured in Muggeridge’s satire on ‘fellow travellers’ and Western press correspondents, Winter in Moscow, as Wilfred Pye – Jones’s report about the orange peel is replicated almost verbatim – but it is more likely that Muggeridge simply fleshed out Pye’s narrative with Jones’s experiences.

It is fitting that, some eighty-five years since his death, Mr. Jones presents a wider audience with the story of Gareth Jones.  In an age of ‘fake news’ and when we doubt (often with just cause) the press’ role as the Fourth Estate, we could do with a few more reminders of the bravery of journalists for whom truth is their only agenda.

Dr David Vessey is Teaching Associate in Modern History at the University of Sheffield. David’s research focuses on modern British political history, specifically the corresponding fortunes of the Labour and Liberal parties, and newspaper history in the twentieth century. He has recently finished a project on political engagement, the press and the suffragettes in Edwardian Britain, which will result in two journal articles in 2020. He is currently researching British press narratives of the Soviet Union in the Stalinist era. You can find David on Twitter @DavidCVessey.

Cover image: A memory plaque at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, erected in 2006 by Ukrainian organizations to commemorate Jones’s deeds. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gareth_Jones_3.jpg, [Accessed 27 January 2020].

[1] Stephen Oleskiw, The Agony of a Nation: The Great Man-Made Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933 (London: The National Committee to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Artificial Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933, 1983), pp. 54-5.

[2] Manchester Guardian, 30 March 1933, p. 12.

[3] Ibid.

[4] S. J. Taylor, Stalin’s Apologist: Walter Duranty, the New York Times’s Man in Moscow (Oxford, 1990), p. 207.

[5] Marco Carynnyk, ‘Making the News Fit to Print: Walter Duranty, the New York Times and the Ukrainian Famine of 1933’ in Roman Serbyn and Bohdan Krawchenko (eds.), Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933 (Edmonton, 1986), pp. 76-7.

[6] Taylor, Stalin’s Apologist, p. 208.

[7] Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine (London, 1986), p. 320.

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Why did the Finnish Prime Minister Resign?: Tripartite Labour Market Relations in Historical Context

Finland TUPO Agreement

Finnish labour market negotiations for the year 2020 have started out messily.[1] So far, the most significant result has been the resignation of the Social Democrat (SDP)-led cabinet on December 3rd over the prime minister’s role in the Posti (the state-owned postal service) labour relations debacle. While this turn of events led to Sanna Marin becoming the youngest PM in the world to much fanfare, it also highlighted the decades long struggle between employers’ associations (now the Confederation of Finnish Industries EK), employee unions (industrial labour union SAK being the most important), and the government over labour market policies.

Most Finnish academic labour market literature – whether economic, sociological, or historical in nature – is only available in Finnish or Swedish. In this short post I will set the Finnish labour market system in its historical context, to help explain the longer history behind recent events. The analysis is based on our research team’s recent work on Finnish labour market history.[2]

Finland has a history of labour market compromises and tripartism stretching back to the Second World War. The relationship between employers and employees was forged out of necessity. The war with the Soviet Union (1939–40, 1941–1944) and the ensuing war reparations (1944–1952) led to increased state control of markets and a technocratic industrial policy system, wherein labour market associations collaborated with the government in building a Nordic welfare state.

Early tripartist efforts gave way to a fully negotiated system in the 1960s. Central labour associations negotiated all-encompassing agreements that set the tone for years to come. The state typically participated in these negotiations via retirement benefit and tax policy reforms. By the 1970s Finland had developed a centralised, comprehensive income policy system.

Throughout the Cold War the economy grew and the employees’ unions advanced their agenda for better working conditions and benefits. When the leading export industries ran into trouble, the Finnish Markka was devalued time after time. This inflation-devaluation cycle was a sore point for the Bank of Finland and by the mid-1980s its monetary experts had successfully lobbied the cabinet for a stable currency policy. This change was compounded by a mid-decade move to open Finnish investment markets to global competition.

Meanwhile the Confederation of Finnish Industries had started to chafe under the labour market negotiation system. Federation leaders argued that Finland had become rigid and uncompetitive. In the early 1990s they decided to change the game.

As the Cold War came to an end and Finland applied for EU membership directly thereafter, the country was wrecked by the most severe depression since the 1930s. While few industrial or trade experts foresaw it, Finnish bilateral trade with the USSR was in dire straits. Banks collapsed and companies went bankrupt while the Finnish currency was set adrift in 1992. Unemployment soared and social safety networks were strained.

The Confederation of Finnish Industries developed a new strategy to change the labour market system in 1991. The plan was to decrease labour safeguards, to cut employment costs for the employers, and to stop making centralised labour agreements, known colloquially in Finland as ‘tupo’ or ‘tulopoliittinen kokonaisratkaisu’, a collective agreement that all must respect regardless of industry or place of work. The employers’ plan was met with dismay and strict opposition from the labour unions. The centre-right cabinet led by the Centre Party (Keskusta) was under severe pressure and failed to support these policy changes. The cabinet preferred stability in the labour markets over the employers demands for more flexibility in employment. The stage was set for a continued struggle over the fundaments of the Finnish system.

The creative destruction of the early 1990s depression and Finnish EU membership started to change the system. Joining the common market meant monetary policy had to change. Low inflation goals guided the Finnish labour market system towards more nuanced change. The Confederation of Finnish Industries continued to push for the dismantlement of the old tripartite system.[3] Employers were angling for local labour negotiations, despite pushback from the employees’ unions and the state.

Step by step, the Finnish economy transformed and opened up to the common market. Competitive exports remained the yardstick by which the economy was measured. The political climate slowly warmed to liberal deregulation and centre-right cabinets that had once been impossible became commonplace. This slow transformation of the labour system forms the foundation of recent volatility.

In 2015 the Confederation of Finnish Industries single-handedly decided to stop negotiating with the employee’s unions. Facing opposition from the other two poles of the system, the employers opted out and forced labour negotiations at the union level.

The Centre Party won the 2015 parliamentary elections and industrialist Juha Sipilä became prime minister heading a coalition with the Coalition Party and populist right-wing Finns Party. To combat the stagnation of the Finnish economy a new competitiveness leap named ‘kiky’ was introduced in 2017.[4] It became the flash point for grievances across the whole system. The leading newspaper Helsingin Sanomat reported that the leap struck women in low paying jobs far more than male dominated export industries.

These recent changes led to tension and ill will between the central labour market actors. When the SDP won the elections in the spring of 2019 the situation changed. Prime minister Antti Rinne had a background in the labour unions, and the social democrats had long been the primary allies for the largest employee union SAK. This turn of events was not lost on the employers and throughout the year harsh words have been changed between labour market actors.

As collective bargaining was off the table, all parties waited for a bellwether. The postal labour action opened the negotiations. The Posti case is an atypical one for a number of reasons. As a state-owned company Posti falls under guidelines for state corporate steering. Like many other former public bureaus, Posti has been under pressure to be economically successful. As postal and package delivery transforms globally, the company has struggled with its legally mandated responsibilities to deliver post state-wide. This mandate ties the case to a third nationally salient issue, Finnish regional politics. To keep all of the country populated, public services are essential in the North and East of Finland. This has historically been at the core of the Centre Party politics, but the party lost many seats in the 2019 elections.

In August Posti decided to move it’s package handlers to a subsidiary company and consequently to a cheaper labour agreement. This action was opposed by employee unions but approved on ministry and cabinet level until it became public knowledge. The company had been under fire for other reasons as well, and in October the CEO had to step down. The PM was caught in this who-said-what row and finally lost the confidence of the Centre party, already a disgruntled cabinet member, and had to resign. The Marin cabinet then continued with the same program and participants.

In short, the Posti labour action became a proxy for many issues other than labour market policy. Intra-cabinet tensions were released with the change of prime minister alleviating the Centre Party’s fears of social democrat labour politics. At the same time the event was an opportunity for the labour unions to raise the stakes for the forthcoming negotiations. The old tripartite labour negotiation system is gone but not forgotten, as Helsingin Sanomat pointed out in November.

As labour unions position for a difficult negotiation round, the very nature of the Finnish system is tested yet again. The employers have had the upper hand for some time now, but the situation remains fluid.

Aaro Sahari is a researcher for the National Museum of Finland and member of the Pitkät kihlajaiset – labour market history project led by professor Niklas Jensen-Eriksen at the University of Helsinki.

Cover image: Collective bargaining agreement signing at the Finnish state cabinet,1984. Courtesy of the Finnish Heritage Agency, reproduced from Finna.fi on a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence. https://www.finna.fi/Record/museovirasto.352499E0B6E49F7E65BA085F29005269 [Accessed 12 January 2020].

[1] As the state broadcaster Yle recently reported.

[2] A comprehensive list of references will be found in our forthcoming book Wuokko M. etal. Loputtomat kihlajaiset: yritykset ja kolmikantakorporatismi Suomessa 1940­–2020 [Endless engagement: corporations and tripartite corporatism in Finland, 1940–2020]. Helsinki: Siltala, 2020.

[3] For example, the very word ‘tupo’ was banished from the vocabulary.

[4] The change forced an extra 24 uncompensated hours of work per annum for all.

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Thirty Years After the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Is Germany Still a Divided Nation?

West_and_East_Germans_at_the_Brandenburg_Gate_in_1989

In 1989, as the Berlin wall fell, Willy Brandt made the somewhat rash prediction that the two halves of Europe belong together and would now grow together. The Cold War represented a frozen dynamic in which everything was subordinated to the needs of a bipolar world order. For Germany, this had meant that the period from 1945 to 1989 also froze its own national dynamic into glacial stasis. There was movement within this stasis but it was so slow to the naked eye that it appeared that nothing could ever change. What the Cold War also did, however, was to gloss over the fact that the two halves of Europe, and with them the two halves of Germany, were not one country in some sort of suspended animation, but were historically fundamentally different anyway. East Germany was not simply a hidden bit of West Germany waiting for the wall to fall but had its own history and trajectory. Most importantly, the history of East Germany reached back much further than 1945.

Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, had always been suspicious of Prussia and areas east of the Elbe. This was a position he had taken already in the 1920s and even as early as 1918 he had argued that western Germany and France should come together in a Rhineland league as defence against the Prussian Behemoth.  Given that by 1947 the decision was made in Washington and Moscow to divide Germany not only into zones of occupation but states in themselves, it is no surprise that Adenauer became what Kurt Schumacher of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) called “Chancellor of the Allies”. Adenauer did everything he could to prevent a new unification of East and West Germany, all the while protesting that German unity was his highest priority.

It is often forgotten, for example, that Schumacher and the SPD saw the division of Germany as the division of the German working-class too. What it also did was divide the confessional make up of Germany. If Germany had been united in 1949 then Protestant voters influenced heavily by East German Protestant parties (not to mention the Nazis) would have been demographically in the majority.

The splitting of Germany meant that West Germany had a majority of Catholic voters who tended to look west to the Rhineland or south to Rome for their ideological affiliations. The East German Communist Party, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), looked East and to Moscow for their ideological underpinnings. By the 1970s, when Erich Honecker took over the leadership of Party and state, the transition to an officially loyal Eastern bloc country was complete. This turn to the Soviet and the Brezhnev social contract was complemented by a re-Prussianisation of the German Democratic Republic. In that same constitution, any reference to Germany as a single nation, which had been present in the 1949 and 1968 constitutions, was removed. They even went as far as banning the words of the national anthem because they talked of German unity:

Risen up from under ruins

Turned to face the future land,

Let us serve you for the better,

Germany, united fatherland.

What is more, Johannes Becher had composed the lyrics so that they could be sung to the tune of what has become the German national anthem, composed by Haydn and Fallersleben. The state and the Party became ever more closely enmeshed and offered absolute social security, full employment (especially for women), and even the outlawing of unemployment as a concept. In return for this security came greater repression, an increased role for the Stasi in its operations against any dissent and a marginalisation of opposition forces. East Germany became a society fully infused with the rule of the Party.

The problem, as with all Soviet bloc parties, was that they had no political legitimacy. The thing that characterised East Germany under Honecker was the absolute primacy of politics over economic considerations. Buying off the working class is always an expensive business and a hyper-centralised system of political control over economic development led to intrinsic inefficiencies. The fulfilment of plans laid down by the central authorities became much more important than efficient production and distribution. Whatever the weaknesses of a market economy may be – and there are certainly many – in competition with a centrally planned system in which the primacy of politics ruled supreme, it was clear by the mid-1980s which system was stronger.

Thus, perestroika (or economic restructuring) was actually far more important than glasnost (democratic openness) and Gorbachev’s reforms were at base about making the Soviet economy more efficient and responsive to market demands. In many ways, China has had the perestroika without the glasnost, reintroducing market imperatives backed up by the absolute authority of state and Party. But East Germany too had a restructuring of the economy forced upon it by marketisation coming from the West after 1989. Almost all leading positions in the East are still occupied by West Germans and the resentments of the East are in part a response to this sense of living under “occupation”. Paradoxically, the main leaders of the populist movement in eastern Germany Gauland, Höcke et al are themselves West Germans who have shifted east in order to lead what they call the “completion of the revolution (Wende)” of 1989.

The problems facing eastern Germany 30 years after the fall of the Wall are multi-layered and complex:

  1. East Germany was always a different country.
  2. Socio-economic resentment against the West plays a significant role in a “what has West Germany ever done for us?“ discourse (apart from the 2 trillion Euros that has flowed from West to East).
  3. The primacy of economics over political considerations, though much weaker than in China, stands in stark contrast to SED rule.
  4. Demographic change as young people, especially women, move west has exacerbated the sense that it is region “left behind”.
  5. AfD populist voters therefore tend to be mostly male and mostly those who spent their childhood in the GDR.
  6. Ostalgie (left-wing nostalgia for the GDR) has now become Nostalgie (right-wing nostalgia for an as yet ill-defined past German nation).

In short, it is unlikely that the tensions between East and West Germany will be resolved in the near future. Germany has always been a country of uncertain borders and shifting cleavages and we may have to face the fact that the two halves of Europe are not growing back together quite as easily as Brandt hoped.

Peter Thompson is Reader Emeritus in German at the University of Sheffield specialising in the post-war history of the GDR and German unification. He founded The Centre for Ernst Bloch Studies at Sheffield in 2008, and was co-editor with Slavoj Zizek of The Privatization of Hope: Ernst Bloch and the Future of Utopia (2013).

Cover image: West and East Germans at the Brandenburg Gate, Berlin, 1989.

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